

Editorial

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Workers voting also for right-wing populist and far-right parties was a common phenomenon in the 20th century. The best-known example of this is probably the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP): Although it always performed weaker in the working-class communities during the Weimar Republic than in the rest of the country, from 1932 it rose to over 30 percent there as well.¹ After taking power, the Nazis were able to convince many workers with their socio-political measures.² Above all, however, they succeeded in one thing: right at the beginning of their rule, they staged the public recognition of the workers as a social group by declaring May Day, traditionally the day of struggle of the left-wing workers' movement, as a non-working public holiday.³

Meanwhile, the image of the worker as a social category remained the same: It was centered around the physically and wage-dependent workers fixated at the bottom end of the social hierarchy and who in most industrialized nations supported movements dedicated to civic equality and solidarity, the 'left'. It was this visible distinction which was gradually lost in the decades of post-Fordist structural change after 1945 – in the capitalist societies of the West as well as in the state-socialist societies of the East. Already then, the impact of this process on workers' political preferences was reflected upon. In 1969, the founder of the Hungarian labor sociology, Gyula Rézler, visited the Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences from his American exile to carry out research on the Hungarian working class. In his 1972 study "Automation: Its impact on the organization and functions of personnel management"⁴ he argued that automation blurred the distinction between the blue- and white-collar workers, decreased trade union membership, and had a negative impact on the attraction of left-wing political ideas and mobilization among the affected stratum of the working class.⁵

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- 1 Cf. Jürgen Falter/Thomas Lindenberger/Siegfried Schumann, *Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik. Materialien zum Wahlverhalten*, München 1986, p. 183. – This Special Issue was supported by the EU Marie Skłodowska-Curie-Action (grant number: NIWGE 846179, <https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/846179>; 11.9.2022).
 - 2 Cf. Timothy W. Mason, *Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft. Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939*, Opladen 1975.
 - 3 Cf. Michael Wildt, *Zerborstene Zeit. Deutsche Geschichte 1918–1945*, München 2022, p. 281.
 - 4 Cf. the recollection of János Farkas, who was the deputy director of the Institute at that time: <https://www.rezler-foundation.hu/az-alapito/farkas-janos-emlekei>; 5.8.2022.
 - 5 The study was published in Hungarian in: Pál Péter Tóth (ed.), *Válogatás Rézler Gyula 1932 és 1999 között megjelent írásiból* [Gyula Rézler, *Selected Writings, 1932–1999*], Budapest 2011. The sociologist István Kemény, who was strongly influenced by Rézler's works, was forced into exile in 1977, where he continued to publish articles that tackled the issues raised by Rézler. His works were republished in Hungarian after the change

Michael Burawoy's seminal study in 1985 comparing "factory regimes under capitalism and socialism" found – as he called it – an increasing tendency towards "hegemonic despotism" both in the "West" and the "East".⁶ At that time, however, he thought that workers in the Eastern European countries (he conducted his relevant fieldwork in Hungary) are more likely to regain a socialist consciousness once they get rid of the tutelage of the ruling Communist Parties than their counterparts in capitalist factories.⁷ Indeed, many Western and Eastern European leftists expected a truly socialist development in Eastern Europe after the collapse of state socialism in the region.

The shattering of these political hopes and workers' refusal to give credit to a new, socialist experiment accelerated processes that Rézler already observed in the US in the 1960s. Workers' alignment with right-wing, populist political parties had been observed in Western – particularly Northern – Europe well before the crisis of the traditional Left was globally thematized,⁸ long before Trump's electoral victory in 2016, which was at least partly attributed to working-class votes from the Rust Belt.⁹ Meanwhile there were other instances of right-wing, populist political leaders rising to power: Bolsonaro, for instance, in Brazil, Narendra Modi in India, and – most significantly – Viktor Orbán, who succeeded to repeatedly win a two-third majority at the Hungarian parliamentary elections of 2022, with his party, Fidesz. Given the fact that he holds an unbroken political power since 2010, we can actually speak of the consolidation of his rule and his regime for which he coined the term "illiberal".¹⁰

These political developments facilitated novel strings of research on right-wing populism across the world. The Special Issue therefore seeks to contribute to a burgeoning academic and political literature but also aspires to deepen scholarly discussion by emphasizing two aspects, which have been underrepresented in this otherwise very diverse and rich discipline. The two aspects are interconnected and lead us back to the world of the Cold War: that is, the relative negligence of Eastern Europe as a geographical region and its distinctive role in the modern world-economy; and the underscoring – or inadequate conceptualization – of the Eastern European state socialist legacy.

of regimes: István Kemény, *Velünk nevelkedett a gép. Magyar munkások a hetvenes évek elején* [We grew up with the machines. Hungarian workers at the beginning of the 1970s], Budapest 1990.

- 6 Michael Burawoy, *The Politics of Production. Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism*, London 1985.
- 7 Burawoy self-critically reflected on this expectation in a later book on his Hungarian fieldwork: Michael Burawoy/János Lukács, *The Radiat Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary's Road to Capitalism*, Chicago 1992.
- 8 Cf. e.g. Marcel van der Linden, *Workers and the Radical Right*. In: *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 93 (2018), pp. 74–78.
- 9 Cf. in particular the writings of Leon Fink, e.g. <https://inthesetimes.com/article/regional-reparations-rustbelt-electoral-politics-fink>; 7.8.2022.
- 10 Orbán's regime received a wide public and academic interest, see, e.g. Adam Fabry, *The Political Economy of Hungary: From State Capitalism to Authoritarian Neoliberalism*, London 2019; Gábor Scheiring, *The Retreat of Liberal Democracy: Authoritarian*

The conceptualization of Eastern Europe has a *longue durée* historical dimension. As Larry Wolff argues in his challenging book “Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment” Western travelers saw the region to be *inferiorly* distinctive well before capitalist industrialization fundamentally transformed the socio-economic landscape of Europe.¹¹ While Wolff argues that this civilizational-cultural hierarchy preceded the economic lagging behind of the European “Other”, Wallerstein explicitly constructed the concept of the semi-periphery to indicate the position of Eastern Europe in the capitalist world-system.¹² The world-system theory found its way to Hungary’s “goulash Communism” well before the actual collapse of state socialism: the academic cooperation of Iván Berend and György Ránki, for instance, produced works which received a wide international recognition.¹³ The Hungarian historian Emil Niederhauser further refined the concept of Eastern Europe by distinguishing between four sub-regions: “Western”-Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic and Slovenia, “Central”-Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Croatia), “Eastern”-Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus) and the Balkan countries.¹⁴ He also devoted much scholarly attention to the essential discrepancy that came to dominate the slogans of the 19th century: nation and progression. In the first half of the 20th century, nationalism increasingly got into a conflictual relationship with capitalist modernization, contributing to the conservation of the semi-feudal political, social and economic structures in the non-Communist parts of the region.¹⁵

The end of the Second World War opened a new chapter in the conceptualization of Eastern Europe. By no account can Germany be seen as part of the European “Other” since the country was one of the world’s strongest industrial nations in the first half of the 20th century. The division of the country, however, brought a new member state into the Soviet “camp”, albeit the GDR still preserved its industrial leading position among the socialist countries. The distinctive historical legacy of state socialism, however, “traditionally” receives less scholarly attention precisely because this legacy – and the conceptualization of “actually existing” socialism – even today belong to one of the most contested issues of the 20th and 21st centuries. In order to link the debate on the *character* of state socialism to the conceptualization of Eastern Europe as described above,

Capitalism and the Accumulative State in Hungary, London 2019; Margit Feischmidt/Balázs Majtényi (eds.), *The Rise of Populist Nationalism: Social Resentments and Capturing the Constitution in Hungary*, Budapest 2019.

- 11 Cf. Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford 1994.
- 12 Cf. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York 1974.
- 13 *The Modern World-System I* was published in 1983 in Hungarian in Budapest.
- 14 Emil Niederhauser, *Előhang 1989 Kelet-Európájához* [Prologue to the Eastern Europe of 1989]. In: *Eszmélet*, 5 (1990), pp. 24–42.
- 15 Cf. Emil Niederhauser, *A kelet-európai fejlődés kérdéséhez* [To the Question of the Eastern European Development]. In: Éva Ring (ed.), *Helyünk Európában* [Our Place in Europe], Budapest 1986, pp. 212 f.

suffice it to cite Niederhauser: “The conceptual framework of Eastern Europe has been criticized on the grounds that it refers back to the socialist ‘peace camp’. Nevertheless, the variant of socialism, the system, which had been formed here, turned out to be different precisely because it had been formed in Eastern Europe.”¹⁶ Our aim is not to enter here into the debate on what this system was, but we definitely would like to point out the *historical* argument, the need to take account of the distinctive role of Eastern Europe in the capitalist world-system – and on the mental map of the Western civilisation.

The core idea of this Special Issue is, thus, to interrogate and understand – fundamentally in an Eastern European (and Eastern German) context – why workers, who were “associated” with left-wing political ideas, *communities* and mobilization during the state socialist era, and also beyond that, changed their political sympathies and became increasingly aligned with right-wing, populist political parties, such as Orbán’s Fidesz or the AfD, which was even referred to as a working-class party, stressing its appeal to this segment of the voters.

While in postwar Western Europe it was also taken for granted that working-class communities and neighborhoods vote to the left, the last decade of the 20th century saw an increasing appeal of populist, far right-wing political parties gaining support amongst workers in many Western European countries. Parallel to this political shift, the allegiance of trade unions and also that of workers to social-democratic parties were weakened. Authors such as Philippe Marlière blamed the embracing of the so-called neoliberal policies by the Western European social democratic parties for this shift.¹⁷

After a short revival of the socialist parties in Central and Eastern Europe in the mid-1990s, which were seen by many as “successor” Communist parties, a similar shift to the right in workers’ votes was observed, while support for the left receded. In the literature discussing this shift of workers’ political orientation in East-Central Europe, David Ost argued,¹⁸ building on his previous study of the roots of Solidarity in Poland,¹⁹ that the liberal intelligentsia betrayed the workers and chose the road of neoliberal capitalism, which effectively impoverished many workers who either lost their jobs or had to be content with very low wages in comparison to the earnings of the new “capitalists” (managers, successful entrepreneurs, etc.). Thus, the workers voted for the radical right in order to punish the intelligentsia and the new neoliberal elite. Kalb and Halmai²⁰ offered a some-

16 Niederhauser, *Előhang*, p. 24.

17 Cf. Philippe Marlière, *The Decline of Europe’s Social Democratic Parties*, Open Democracy, 2010 (<https://www.opendemocracy.net/philippe-marliere/decline-of-europes-social-democratic-parties>; 8.8.2022).

18 Cf. David Ost, *The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe*, Ithaca, NY 2005.

19 Cf. David Ost, *Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-politics. Opposition and Reform in Poland 1968*, Philadelphia 1990.

20 Cf. Don Kalb/Gábor Halmai (eds.), *Headlines of Nation, Subtexts of Class: Working-Class Populism and the Return of the Repressed in Neoliberal Europe*, New York 2011.

what different explanation for the increasing appeal of the radical right amongst workers. To simplify the key thesis of their book, they argue that globalization and neoliberal capitalism disrupted traditional working-class communities, rendering workers more dependent on the whims of capitalism. Right-wing populism offers a panacea for the insecurity of the world and the everyday struggle for a decent living. Kalb argued a decade later that the “illiberal revolution” was best seen as the popular and populist counterpunch, in which the “orientalized” losers of the transition express their *ressentiments* towards the “colonizing” West.²¹

For an explanation of the triumph of “illiberalism” in countries such as Hungary and Poland, Chris Hann reached back to the theoretical framework of Karl Polanyi elaborated in his classical work, “The Great Transformation”.²² For Polanyi, trade unions were an important instrument in society’s struggle to protect itself from the ravages of a “disembedded” market economy. But another possible form of countermovement was Fascism, understood as a movement to “bring economy and polity back together in a new, antidemocratic amalgam”.²³

Hann applies this model of *disembedding* to Eastern Europe, which became a laboratory for neoliberal experimentation after 1989/90 (see e.g. Peter Gowan, who explicitly spoke of “imperialism”).²⁴ Communities, factories and collective farms all disintegrated, while new, nationalistic identities have been promulgated with the ostensible aim of protecting society from the ills of globalization and reckless marketization. The vacuum left by the withdrawal of the political left from the representation of the working people was successfully filled by the right, notably by Fidesz in Hungary.

While the Hungarian case received a wide political and academic attention since 2010, when Orbán succeeded to return to political power after he had lost the parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2006, in the German case, it was Klaus Dörre, who provided a profound analysis of the relative success of the AfD – albeit the party’s leaders can only “envy” Orbán’s political victories. He was the first to point out the working-class appeal of the party – in spite of the fact that the AfD, in fact, has little to offer economically to the workers given its pro-market stance.²⁵ People’s political choices are, however, not driven by “mere” mathematical calculations as he argues when he refers to Marx’s analysis of Bonapartism in his contribution to this special issue. While direct historical analogies can be often

21 Don Kalb, *Post-Socialist Contradictions: The Social Question in Central and Eastern Europe and the Making of the Illiberal Right*. In: Jan Breman/Kevan Harris/Ching Kwan Lee/Marcel van der Linden (eds.), *The Social Question in the Twenty-first Century: A Global View*, Berkeley 2019, p. 213.

22 Cf. Chris Hann, *Repatriating Polanyi. Market Society in the Visegrad States*, Budapest 2019.

23 Cf. Hann, *Repatriating*, p. 11.

24 Cf. Peter Gowan, *Neo-liberal Theory and Practice fo Eastern Europe*. In: *New Left Review*, 213 (1995), pp. 3–60.

25 Cf. Klaus Dörre, *In der Warteschlange. Arbeiter*innen und die radikale Rechte*, Münster 2020.

misleading, it is still worth underlining that in the research led by Dörre, some interview partners raised the issue of direct democracy, through which they hoped to make their voice heard. At the same time, it is alarming that they have not distanced themselves from violence, and also, that they saw no contradiction between the support of the AfD – or even Pegida – and the representation of labor interests in the factory. This suggests that many workers feel left behind by the “traditional” political parties also in Germany.

Stefan Berger's study of the workers of the Ruhr area offers further illuminating insights into the working-class appeal of the AfD. This appeal is not necessarily connected only with economic factors – albeit one of the Western strongholds of the AfD is the “poorest” town (Gelsenkirchen) in Germany. The Ruhr area was the industrial “heart” of Germany at a time when heavy industry and mining constituted the most prestigious industrial branches. “Ruhri” indicated a distinctive – mainly male working-class – identity and also an economic status, which enabled working-class men to fulfil the obligations of the “breadwinner”. The crisis – or outright loss – of these identities triggers deep feelings of social and human insecurity and breeds xenophobia, Islamophobia and strong anti-migrant discourses and attitudes. All these can be easily exploited by the politicians of the AfD in order to win working-class social support. Stefan Berger also examined the attempts of the AfD to take over the trade unions and works councils – he concluded that in spite of the efforts of the party, success has been meagre.

The observation that the political left can only be successful if it preserves its influence at the workplace is reinforced by *Alexandr Osipian's* examination of the case of the Donbas, where the independent trade unions failed to gain ground after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the state-led trade unions' structures. Of course, the desperate economic situation of the Ukrainian citizens grossly undermined left-wing political attempts to organize labor or promote a Western-type democracy. Suffice it to cite here that, according to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology in April 2020, 11,5 percent of Ukraine's population struggled to afford food, 33,8 percent could afford little beyond food, and 29,6 percent could afford only a little beyond food and clothes.²⁶ What is common in the crisis of the “traditional” working-class identities forged in the Ruhr area and the Donbas is – beyond the economic troubles that arise from unemployment and the failure to find a new job – the essential loss of social recognition or rather, the loss of any chance to gain recognition as a “normal” worker. This facilitates the forging of new identities for which the far right offers ample “solutions”.

The invisibility of workers in public and social media is a strong “indicator” of the devaluation of industrial manual work – which was once seen as the main

26 Cf. Yuliya Yurchenko/Pavlo Kutuev/Maksym Yenin/Hennadii Korzhov, Class Divisions and Social Inequality in Independent Ukraine. In: Mykhailo Minakov/Georgiy Kasianov/Matthew Rojansky (eds.), *From “The Ukraine” to Ukraine. A Contemporary History, 1991–2021*, Stuttgart 2021, pp. 95–137.

source of economic and human production *and* working-class dignity. In the 1960s even in the media of Communist countries there has been a discussion on the social impacts of automation – and the subsequent shrinking of the industrial working class (which was “disguised” as a truly socialist society, where people have enough time to do creative jobs, take part in educational programs, enjoy leisure activities, etc.). Empirical evidence in the 2010s, however, reveals a different picture. As *Ondřej Daniel* notes, a more recent cultural sociology model argues that the contemporary Czech working class consists of several sub-classes, two of which are described as compromised in some way: the “endangered” and “suffering” classes.²⁷ Kateřina Nedbálková, who draws on her research into life in a shoemaking factory in eastern Moravia observes, however that if these two “broken” classes together represent up to 40 percent of the Czech population, then there must be something deeply wrong with either contemporary Czech society or the model and its terminology.²⁸ Daniel’s study of the fans and (self-)image of Ortel, a Czech Band in the mid-2010s offers a fascinating but at the same time disturbing analysis of the roots and consequences of the lack of working-class recognition, which pushes workers to the far right in their quest for new identities. Since class identities have been systematically destroyed and deconstructed in Eastern Europe as part of the discredited “Communist” legacy, ethno-nationalism emerged as a new language and ideology, which translates workers’ experience of injustice and exploitation into political and social mobilization. Ortel may be “just” a far right-wing, nationalistic band; however, the alarming thing is that the band is popular and even received prestigious national awards, which may reflect the changing political mood in contemporary Czech society – a country of “Western”-Eastern Europe.

Eva Svatoňová analyzes anti-gender discourses in Czechia, and her main research question nicely complements the Special Issue with a dimension that is often understudied – or misunderstood – in the Eastern European context. While workers have been traditionally associated with progressive social(ist) values, at least in the left-wing political culture, in fact, “traditional” working-class families would often stick to patriarchal gender roles and ideologies. While Svatoňová notes that anti-gender discourses are supported by middle-class, educated, religious women, her target group are working-class women, who choose to side with their middle-class “sisters”, whom they otherwise envy (“the Prague people”) or despise. Why, then, do working-class women give support – and activist work – for anti-gender discourses? What are the main sources of *ressentiment*? The paper’s research question is illuminating and disturbing – not only in contemporary Czechia.

27 Cf. Daniel Prokop, *Slepé skvrny. O chudobě, vzdělávání, populismu a dalších výzvách české společnosti* [Blind spots. On poverty, education, populism and other challenges of Czech society], Brno 2019.

28 Cf. Kateřina Nedbálková, *Tichá dřina* [Silent Toil], Prague 2021.

Paulus Wagner also starts from “established” working-class social identities or *habitus* in the sense of Bourdieu, and he seeks to answer the question of what happens to the *habitus* in a completely different socio-economic context through a very extensive oral history project conducted in Germany and Austria. He stresses the moral frame and underlying core values that can trigger different political choices and at a group level, eventually political coalitions between workers and other social groups. Wagner argues that the majority of his interview partners put laborist frames center stage when making sense of their position in economy, state, and society. Laborism emphasizes the idea that (manual) work is a valuable contribution to the common good and source of deservingness; it sees universal participation through paid work as favorable for individuals and community. However, what happens in a society, where manual work no longer gives the moral and economic recognition that workers feel it *deserves*? Wagner’s paper offers an insightful analysis of the perceived “displacement” of manual workers in contemporary Western societies.

At the beginning of this essay, we stressed the importance of the historical dimension. *Tibor Valuch* provides a thorough study of the shifting political alliances of the Hungarian working class in the 20th century. As Rézler already pointed out in his seminal work on the formation of the Hungarian industrial working class, this social stratum was always very diverse – ethnically, socially, religiously and politically.²⁹ Valuch studies the shifting political alignments of the workers on the example of Ózd, which was a factory town in north-western Hungary, famous for mining and metallurgy well before the Communist industrialization. Of course, the latter gave a fresh impetus to the development of the town. While mining operated at a loss already in the 1980s, the change of regimes stripped the factory town of all industries and resources. Ózd, which used to be a stronghold for the political left, followed the example of the hometown of Didier Eribon: the mayor of the 2010s comes from a party, which explicitly built its identity on the far right (when Fidesz projected itself as a party of the central right).

Adrian Grama’s paper offers a highly challenging and original analysis of how the concepts of totalitarianism and populism had been used by specific actors in former times. We tend to understand totalitarianism as strictly incompatible with Western perspectives – at least during the Cold War. Grama, however, quotes the expert for international monetary and financial relations, Jeff Frieden: “Of lending to independent Algeria, one banker noted that ‘we like it because it is totalitarian and if the government says people will have to cut back consumption, they will.’”³⁰ On the other hand, Poland’s economic troubles at the beginning of the 1980s were openly attributed by the same bankers to Edward Gierek’s “populist” policies.

29 Gyula Rézler, *A magyar nagyipari munkásság kialakulása 1867–1914* [The formation of the Hungarian large industrial working class 1867–1914], Budapest 1938.

30 Quoted in: Jeff Frieden, *Third World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico, Brazil, Algeria and South Korea*. In: *International Organization*, 35 (1981) 3, pp. 407–431, here 424.

Grama explores the activities of the International Centre of Free Trade Unionists in Exile (ICFTUE) by focusing on its monthly bulletin, “Le Syndicaliste exilé”, and “România Muncitoare”, a magazine social-democrat Eftimie Gherman edited between 1951 and 1961 in order to answer the question how this string of thinkers and trade union activists understood totalitarianism and explained it to a Western audience interested/involved in labor issues. As Grama shows, Gherman’s idea(l) remained to be a socialist society, which can uphold public (but not state!) ownership. For him, the Soviet Union was primarily an “underdeveloped” state, which parasites on the resources of Eastern Europe (and here we are back to the original problem: what constitutes Eastern Europe?). Nationalism offered a “panacea” for this criticism, and Gherman eventually returned to Ceaușescu’s neo-totalitarian Romania.

We cannot, of course, judge people who spent decades in exile. Rézler eventually made a very successful career in the US, and in the 1990s he seriously considered moving back to Hungary (his Hungarian friends talked him out of it). Some of them may well have foreseen the new era of nationalism, which, in 2010, triggered an “illiberal” turn in Hungary. In order to understand the deeper causes of this turn, however, it is worth (re)reading the papers of this Special Issue. As Alexandr Osipian notes, the phenomenon of the working poor – that is, employed persons living in poverty – has spread all over Ukraine. We can add that even if working people in “Western”-Eastern Europe or further to the West are “better off”, they still see their social status declining, which leads to anger and frustration that can easily translate into the support of radical views or – at worst – into political violence. Being a worker meant something in Eastern Europe – certainly until the change of regimes. As a comparative survey showed, even after *die Wende* significantly more people identified themselves as members of the working class in the former GDR and Hungary than in Western Germany, which suggests that people still felt a certain “belonging” to this imaginary community.³¹ As recent surveys show, a certain distinctive identity can still be found in Eastern Germany, which is also “translated” into political differences.³² The far right has been increasingly successful to mobilize anger and – just or unjust – *ressentiment*. The case of Hungary should be a warning example in this respect, which shows an amalgam of all the factors that, in the course of the 20th century, have so often (mis)lead the “little people”.

31 Cf. Róbert Angelusz/Róbert Tardos, Társadalmi átrétegződés és szociális-politikai identifikáció [Social re-stratification and social-political identification]. In: Szociológiai Szemle, 2 (1995), pp. 85–97.

32 Cf. e.g. Jeffrey Kopstein/Daniel Ziblatt, Honecker’s Revenge: The Enduring Legacy of German Unification in the 2005 Election. In: German Politics & Society, 1 (2006), pp. 134–147.