

Editorial

During the Third Reich historians and social scientists developed an increasingly sophisticated set of tools with which to record and illustrate as many motives for resistance as possible. Resistance as a form of open opposition to a dictatorial regime was considered to merely be the most obvious expression within a range of behaviour which could be set in motion by unconventional responses to sanctioned norms. Since the collapse of the Soviet empire the question has also been posed as to whether or not and in what way people under USSR control either circumvented social and cultural norms or reinvented them in a creative way, thereby asserting their *Eigen-Sinn* individually.

In his contribution *Norm, Abweichung und Aneignung: Kulturelle Konventionen und unkonventionelle Kulturen in der Nachkriegsowjetunion* (Norms, Divergence and Acquisition: Cultural Conventions and Unconventional Cultures in the post-war Soviet Union) Malte Rolf shows that standardized culture in the form of an “inner sovietization” of society did, in fact, allow freedom for divergent cultural practices. Numerous niches in which it was possible to develop creativity and subjectivity by individual acquisition existed within the cultural corset. This does not mean the existence of a radical counter-culture, but rather the expression of unconventional accentuations which varied from the norm. Nonetheless, basic opposition to the regime did develop from these beginnings, as the author points out using the example of the “singing” revolution in the Baltic states. In the accepted “circles of artistic automatism” many Soviet member states had retained a repertoire of traditional national folklore which, though it merged with elements of general Soviet cultural norms, was also in a position to free up resistance potential. In a dynamic process these new areas of action made it possible, for example, to demonstrate in favour of national independence on Red Square on the 1st of May. This led to the re-evaluation of Soviet norms.

The contribution provided by *János Tischler* “*Lasst uns zumindest ihren Kindern zu Hilfe eilen!*“ *Die politische Opposition in Ungarn und die polnische Gewerkschaft Solidarność* (“At least let us rush to the aid of their children!” Political opposition in Hungary and the Polish trade union *Solidarność*) points out that the decline of the Kádár regime and the Hungarian opposition movements which grew out of that process came at the same time as the Polish crisis. The so-called Democratic Opposition in Hungary emerged in 1979 with petitions supporting Czechoslovakian civil rights activists and the foundation of a “fund for the support of the poor”. If only for reasons of foreign policy due to the high debts they had run up in the West, the Kádár regime attempted to domesticate the opposition in their own country with leniency, also arguing for administrative measures and at most the intervention of domestic forces where the Polish situation was concerned. The Hungarian leadership balked at armed intervention by the Warsaw Pact states. Internally it pointed to the relative pros-

perity of the Hungarian population and gave sharp warnings to Hungarian workers and intellectuals against going down the route taken by the Poles. The cooperation between the Polish and Hungarian opposition movements which began in 1977 intensified in 1980/81, with individual Hungarian civil rights activists demonstrating their solidarity with and taking part in the Polish protests. Having been on the peripheral of society up to that point, the Democratic Opposition in Hungary group experienced a boost in mobilization due to the Solidarność movement, something which was reflected in a drastic increase in Samisdat literature amongst other effects. The now-institutionalized Hungarian opposition organized acts of solidarity and sent liaison representatives to regular meetings with Polish opposition members, with the latter repeatedly expelled from Poland. After September 1980 had seen Solidarność encourage workers in “brother states” to also form independent trade unions, Kádár called upon the Warsaw leadership to act firmly “against the enemies of socialism”. From that point onwards Budapest carried out an active campaign of propaganda against Solidarność. As elsewhere, the stereotype of the lazy Pole was used, suggesting to the Hungarian population that it would have to pay for the Polish episode in the form of “brotherly help”. The imposition of martial law in Poland in mid-December 1981 was welcomed in Budapest, with aid work carried out by the Hungarian opposition taken on by the Hungarian regime. The common memory of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 played a significant role in the relationship between the two opposition groups. At the end of 1982 and during 1983 the Kádár regime smashed the Hungarian opposition, though this did not prevent its own collapse five years later.

In their contribution *Solidarność - nur ein polnischer Traum von der Freiheit?* (Solidarność - merely a Polish dream of freedom?), *Gerhard Besier* and *Katarzyna Stokłosa* discuss the question of the significance of this first system-changing opposition movement to the Poland and Europe of today. The contribution begins with a historical recapitulation of the story of continuous Polish opposition since 1956. The East-Berlin and Prague administrations had greater success than their Hungarian counterparts in turning their national populations against the Polish movement and fixing negative stereotypes of the Polish population in their minds. Despite all the pressure on them, a hard core of the Solidarność movement continued to pursue its aims, and in spring 1989 reached agreement with the leadership on the formation of a “round table”. In following this strategy they were to show the way to other opposition movements in the eroding Eastern Bloc. Today, in both the East and the West, Solidarność is considered to be one of the most resolute opposition or freedom movements in Europe. It promoted aspiration to democracy and thereby brought about fundamental change to political, economic and cultural life in Poland. There is a tendency in Poland to take Solidarność as a national movement alone, thereby underestimating the European context - and in particular the CSCE process and economic aid from the West - which promoted it. On the other hand it is true that, in their own way, the concepts followed by the Christian Democratic Party/Liberal Demo-

cratic administration stabilized the existing system against Solidarność. The Polish population continues to see Solidarność both in a mainly positive light and as an important European movement. Nonetheless, it is conspicuous that the majority of Polish citizens connect Solidarność with a national event which was of limited significance to their own lives. As the people of other Eastern Bloc states also tended to view “their” opposition movements with a national slant, Solidarność has as yet been unable to become the basis of a European “master narrative”.

Using a wide range of sources – and in particular Prague state security files – *Thomáš Vilímek* portrays *Kontakte zwischen den ČSSR und den DDR-Bürgern in der Zeit zwischen 1968 und 1989* (contacts between the ČSSR and citizens of the GDR between 1968 and 1989). On the one hand he investigates contact between opposition members in both states, whilst on the other he describes the perceptions “normal” citizens of the ČSSR and GDR had of each other. In doing this he adopts as his starting point the hypothesis that both societies were more similar than they initially appear. As early as the 1960s active exchanges took place between low-ranking Protestant churchmen from both countries. This also served the purposes of the publication and procurement of literature. Intellectuals from the GDR are known to have taken part in acts of protest against the quelling of the Prague Spring. These actions began to create a profile for the GDR opposition movement, and were followed by cross-border collaboration with other opposition groups in Eastern Central Europe. In all cases these collaborations and the actions which resulted from them were restricted to the involvement of a small circle of people, whereby the intensity of common protest action increased substantially during the final years of the dictatorship. Support from Czechoslovakian exiles played a significant role where the opposition was concerned. Without doubt the “normal” citizens of both countries maintained mutual prejudice which continued to feed the regime. Nonetheless, many sympathetic feelings were also in evidence (for example in connection with the Prague Spring), something the ministry for state security was obliged to record. Some citizens of the GDR actively supported the Czechoslovakian freedom movement. From 1972 onwards – when it became possible to move between the ČSSR and the GDR without a passport or visa – East and West German relatives and friends preferred to meet in the ČSSR. 75 % of all attempts to cross the border into West Germany took place starting on ČSSR territory. Whilst the Czech border policemen sought to thwart such attempts, there were also Czech citizens who were given to supporting the would-be escapees. GDR citizens who harboured no intentions to defect also enjoyed visiting the ČSSR, as its cultural scene seemed to them more colourful and enticing than that of their own country. The Czechs and Slovaks, on the other hand, were of the opinion that a wider range of consumer goods were available in the GDR and that economic conditions were better than in their own country. Overall, the author notes that respective knowledge of the other country and its citizens was somewhat sketchy.

In his comparative investigation *Demokratiekonsolidierung und die Opposition in Polen und der DDR 1945-1989* (Democratic consolidation and the opposition in Poland and the GDR 1945-1989) *Tytus Jaskułowski* asks to what extent the actions of the opposition in both countries influenced later processes of democratic consolidation. In contrast with the common interpretation that Polish resistance is known throughout Europe as the spearhead which brought about an awakening in Eastern Central Europe, the author seeks to make “a small plea for the East German opposition”. He writes that, though they were less prominent than their Polish counterparts, they contributed more to the later processes of democratic consolidation. In making his case Jaskułowski goes back to the conditions under which the Soviet satellite states were founded, coming to the conclusion that, in terms of its democratic potential, the Soviet Occupation Zone/GDR benefited from Germany’s separation and the resultant indirect influence on it from Western powers, whereas Poland was at the mercy of unbowed sovietization to a much greater extent. The author writes that, until 1949 at least, there was a “more or less normal party system” and – even though highly impeded – the first signs of democratic principles in the Soviet Occupation Zone. The civil war which raged in Poland between 1945 and 1948, on the other hand, provided the Soviets and their Polish allies with a further excuse to nip any movement towards democracy in the bud. During the course of post-1949 Stalinization, the GDR and Poland developed in parallel. In the case of both countries, opposition to this deprivation of rights and the notable pressures felt in every facet of life came from churches alone. The author continues that from the death of Stalin until around 1957 a certain liberalization was apparent in Poland, whereas the familiar strict course was kept to in the GDR. He also notes that this reversal of circumstances in both countries saw Poland take up the democratization elements seen during the early years of the Soviet Occupation Zone. Jaskułowski is of the opinion that a phase of stabilization characterized by modest concessions on the part of the state powers took hold between Khrushchev’s assumption of power and the mid-1960s. The Catholic Church in Poland in particular was granted a certain level of independence, with collectivization also abolished and greater freedom given to critical intellectuals and artists. This development provided a basis for opposition movements. Conversely, Walter Ulbricht’s GDR maintained a rigid post-Stalinist course, built the Wall and suppressed all criticism. According to Jaskułowski, the more favourable economic conditions in the GDR also hindered its citizens in taking paths of protest similar to those followed by the Poles. The 1970s saw opposition movements in both countries strengthen, though this trend had not yet reached significant proportions in the GDR. Nonetheless, Jaskułowski identifies in these movements the nucleus of the democratic consolidation process which took place after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Structures of power in both countries exhibited weaknesses, with international dependence forcing them to act in moderation against dissidents. As early as 1976 some members of the Sejm dared to abstain from voting; the influence of the Catholic Church contin-

ued to increase, particularly after the election of Wojtyła. The economic disaster became apparent during the second half of the 1970s. In the GDR the opposition discovered niche issues such as ecology, peace work and social work, therefore avoiding central confrontation with the state for a certain period of time. Though they were barely coordinated, Jaskułowski sees the roots of future pluralism in the parish-level actions of church members. Though 1980s Poland witnessed the emergence of the powerful oppositional trade union movement *Solidarność*, Jaskułowski regards their leadership as having used the same repressive methods as the ruling Communist Party. These methods led to increasing radicalization, though not to pluralisation of the movement. Rather than strengthening democratic development, *Solidarność* undermined the political consciousness of the Polish citizens, for example in their calls for an election boycott. In the GDR, on the other hand, various grass-roots groups sprang up which developed political concepts and practiced common democratic processes. In Poland, agreements were made between the ruling Communist Party and the opposition after the fall of Communism; this did not occur in the GDR. The GDR opposition movement gave rise to relatively stable political conditions, whereas *Solidarność* fragmented into a large number of parties with short life spans.

The article *Resistance and Dissent under Communism: The Case of Romania*, by *Cristina and Dragoș Petrescu* explains why it was that the Ceausescu dictatorship still collapsed even though their country did not exhibit similar resistance structures against the Communist regime to those in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. They attribute the distinction between their country and these other countries to Romania's almost complete lack of both a civil society and political culture. In contrast with a number of the named countries, a strong sense of anti-political privateness also existed within subcultures of resistance within circles of intellectuals and workers in Romania, thereby contributed to the paralysis of Romanian civil society. The authors distinguish between two waves of resistance mobilization, namely a retrospective wave between 1944 and 1962 and a second wave between 1977 and 1989, which was completely independent of the initial wave and is to be seen in the context of the Helsinki Process. Although the worker's movement only had weak traditions (which were, moreover, closely linked to the Communist regime), Romanian workers also came to the decision to carry out strikes. In 1979 a small group attempted to found an independent trade union; it lasted just half a year. The authors divide worker resistance into three periods: 1950 and 1958, when numerous regional revolts took place; 1958 to 1977, when the Communist regime succeeded in pacifying the working class by providing them with certain privileges; and post-1977. The mining workers' strike of August 1977, a reaction to the noticeable worsening of the social situation, involved the participation of 40,000 workers. It was ended by Ceausescu's announcement that the demands of the workers would be met. However, the actual result was the relocation of the strike leaders to other mines and the early quelling of future social protests. The

first workers' protest directed at Ceausescu, which had around 4,000 participants, took place in Brasov in mid-November 1987. As in other Eastern Bloc countries the protests were sparked off by economic problems before turning into political demands. The authors compare the events in Brasov with those witnessed in Poznan in 1956. The migrant percentage in the four Romanian regions where unrest broke out at the end of the 1980s stood at 25 %. This population was particularly hard-hit by the prevailing economic misery, as they were no longer able to gain extra income by running their nearby family farms. In contrast with Poland latent animosity reigned between intellectuals and workers in Romania – this is one reason why it was not possible for a trade union such as *Solidarność* to emerge. Intellectual dissent (the “Goma movement”) had disappeared from Romania over time, with just a couple of dozen critical intellectuals left in the country at the end of the 1980s. Ceausescu's programme of modernization and nation-building also enjoyed widespread approval amongst the elite, with conformism proving itself a route to state positions and privileges, such as trips to the West. Alongside the few dissidents and the many conformists a not insignificant number of people in Romania who neither openly criticized nor openly supported (“resistance through culture”) the system existed. They were tolerated but also marginalized by the regime. There were those amongst emigrants in exile who actively worked against the regime, whether by appearing in the media, working for in human rights organizations or by supporting dissidents still in the country. As a consequence of the Helsinki Process, and on the initiative of the author Paul Goma, Romanian dissidents directed an open letter signed by 200 people to the follow-up conference in Belgrade, in which they made complaints about Romania's (non-)compliance with human rights regulations. Many were able to bring about their exit from the country without entering into a public debate of individual human rights in Romania. According to the authors, in view of collective traditions individual human rights continue to this day to be outside of the issues at the top of the political agenda. Though the number of plucky dissidents increased substantially at the end of the 1980s, the authors note that the story of intellectual resistance in Romania remains a sequence of stories about a small number of personalities. This weak overall expression of dissident behaviour is a symptom of the significant societal differences between Romania and Eastern Central Europe; these differences also affected the transition process and remain perceptible to this day.

Alongside the articles which form the main focus of this issue, three further contributions have been included which deal with elements from the wider context of the main topic. We remain initially in South-Eastern Europe with the essay *Serbiens selbst auferlegte Isolierung – Thesen über den serbischen Nationalismus* (Serbia's self-imposed isolation – theories on Serbian nationalism) by *Dokica Jovanović*, in which he portrays both the inner conflicts between modernization and traditionalism and East and West, as well as the entirely popular refusal to enter into an urgently needed transition process in his country. After the collapse of Soviet socialism an ideological vacuum was also created in the

Soviet satellite states. This vacuum was filled with traditionalistic elements from each country's own history. Liberal principles remained foreign to this way of thinking. Today, the consequences of this anti-liberal, traditionalistic stance in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe include the revival of the exclusion of minority groups such as Roma and Jews. "To a greater extent than in Western Europe, extreme right-wing political groups are aggressively seeking a space they can assume: proto-fascist, clerical-nationalist, [...] pro-Bolshevist and right-leaning associations as one." In modern history it was not individual but collective self-identification which determined social interaction. In contrast with the civil cultures of the West, Balkan culture was Eastern patriarchal, which lacked progressive thought and an urbane way of life which encouraged ideas of freedom. As a result, a political community which was not purely based on ethnic criteria lacked cultural and economic development potential. The only unifying bond which remained was Serbian ethno-nationalism, which cut itself off from the outside world (which was seen as threatening) on the one hand and craved for the integration of all territories inhabited by Serbians on the other. A situation such as this gives rise to constant demands for a past-fixated "return to the roots" and for "tradition". According to the author, a pseudo-traditionalistic, depersonalized collective is characterized by a complete lack of solidarity and a high level of insensitivity towards the suffering of others. Nationalisms in the former Yugoslavia amplified each other, leading to isolation, self-isolation and the break-up of the relationships which had previously existed in the country. Against this backdrop, Slobodan Milošević's Serbia – which had declared the defence of the apparently "threatened Serbian nationality" as its highest maxim – estranged itself further and further from united, civil Europe. It was Serbian intellectuals who belonged to the so-called "national intelligentsia" who had already constructed the self-image of Serbia on which Milošević was able to lean. It included Serbia's right to lead all Balkan Slavs. While artists, authors and scientists often formed the core of opposition groups in Eastern Central Europe, the Serbian Authors' Association and the Serbian Academy of Science and Art actually supported Milošević's politics with highly emotional, romanticized manifestos. The author sees today's largest problem as the fact that there are no signs of the "dechauvinization" of Serbian and no readiness to acknowledge the crimes committed, only silence. Jovanović argues for a dechauvinization process which identifies those responsible along the lines of the denazification process.

Gerhard Besier's contribution Täter und Opfer, Zuschauer und Opponenten. Über menschliches Verhalten in Grenzsituationen (Perpetrators and victims, spectators and opponents. Human behaviour in borderline situations) offers provisional explanations as to how and why people find themselves in the named roles. Initial perpetrator profiles were created on the basis of gruesome, bad-to-the-bone people on the one hand and easily temptable citizens led astray by some demonic gang on the other. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, social psychologists and historians discovered either through experiments or historical reconstructions that perpetrators were "totally normal people" who behaved

like beasts in certain situations. These situations involved stimuli which led these people to take on a role which no-one would ever have expected them capable of assuming. "Perpetrators" as well as "victims", "spectators" and "opponents" are "rewarded" in various ways as a result of their behaviour in particular situations. In view of such findings, one should clarify which genetic and social factors it is that determine human behaviour, and which complex neurobiological processes dictate current human behaviour. Against this backdrop the question of the extent to which traditional humanistic or Christian views of man are compatible with naturalistic modes of human operation is discussed. Could it even be that the time has come to formulate a modified anthropology which corresponds more accurately to human motivation and behavioural predispositions?

In view of the fact that the term and perhaps vague notion of "ecstasy" is somewhat fashionable amongst some historians, *Eva Weber-Guskar's "philosophical exposition"* deals with the question *Ist Rausch ein Gefühl?* (Is ecstasy a feeling?). In her initial analysis of the use of speech, the author seeks to "point out conceptual inconsistencies which are to be found in the scattered sections of meaning". Her hypothesis is that "the [...] idea of mass ecstasy is based on a distorted view of what it is that constitutes a feeling". According to Weber-Guskar, feelings - "a qualitative, structured whole made up of perception, notion and worldly dismay" possess intentionality and rationality. In her opinion, they are not only productive in thinking and acting, but are in fact the facilitators of thinking and acting and contribute to the motivation to act. After all, as she points out, one is able to perceive feelings judgmentally; as such they represent a further form of information as cognitions. Weber-Guskar notes that this is not linked to "personality decay", indeed the opposite is more fitting: feelings are a fundamental element of our understanding of the world. She therefore comes to the conclusion that: "The idea of 'ecstasy' as a fundamental emotional condition which removes personality boundaries and accompanies irrational action does not appear to me to be a logical idea." and asks whether or not the concept of ecstasy is merely rhetoric "used by particular people for particular purposes". In directing her criticism from a particular philosophical perspective she implicitly underlines the importance of interdisciplinary work. Other disciplines such as psychophysiology would certainly be able to contribute further points of view to those expressed from her perspective.

As usual, this issue is rounded off by a series of discussions of new books.

Gerhard Besier