The article discusses the relationship between officially decreed culture norms and their unconventional implementation in the Soviet Union. It discusses the Soviet culture canon and its relevance in the creation of societal hierarchies and the possibilities of its individual reception. The Baltic Soviet Republics’ independence movements show how the practice of the stubborn implementation of cultural norms exploded the Soviet frame of reference and mutated into open resistance.

When the Polish Crisis broke out in 1980/81, Janos Kadar’s political system in Hungary was already past its high point. The anti-Communist opposition, which was treated with a relative amount of tolerance by the government, emerged as Kadar’s policies began to show evidence of their decay. One of the main sections of the Hungarian Opposition, the so-called Democratic Opposition, considered the “Polish way” worthy of Hungarian emulation. The founding of the Solidarity movement also led them to organize themselves better and create a political action program. At the same time, this also offered Poles the opportunity to extend their influence through the work of the Solidarity movement

“Solidarnosc” has become the primary symbol of hope as well as that of the love of freedom in Poland. Historical myths of national conservative provenance are increasingly overpowering the experiences of 1980/1981 and the political and cultural impulses that were unleashed in Poland at that time. The following questions will be addressed in the article: To what revolutionary history does Solidarnosc have a connection? What is the importance of this revolutionary movement not only for Poland but also for the Soviet Union’s other satellite states? What significance did the Helsinki Accords and West Germany’s “Ostpolitik” possess in Poland’s democratization?

Based on archival materials, this essay includes descriptions of connections between opposition groups as well as civic contact between citizens in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic between 1968 and 1989. This pertains, on the one hand, to the goal-oriented, transnational cooperation in the interest of changing society in both countries, while on the other it is about personal relationships that developed while people were on vacation and opportunities for G.D.R. citizens to meet West German family members in Czechoslovakia or to use it to stage their escape from the republic. Finally, the essay seeks to answer the question as to what the national governments of both countries thought of the contacts.

The democratic opposition has decisively influenced the democratic consolidation process in Poland and the G.D.R. Indeed, the polish opposition accelerated the system change, but the dissidents did not develop the primary guidelines for society in the consolidated democracy, because of the united fight against communism and weak political education. East Germans, however, did. Such an opinion confirms the development of party systems in both countries after 1989.

Obwohl es auch in Rumänien Dissidenten gab, beförderten deren Aktivitäten weder die Revolution von 1989, noch stellten sie während des frühen Postkommunismus eine Alternative zum Neo-Kommunismus bereit. Der vorliegende Aufsatz betrachtet die bemerkenswertesten Resistenz-Handlungen von Persönlichkeiten aus dem intellektuellen Milieu wie solche der Arbeiterschaft, um die Besonderheiten der politischen Subkulturen des mit Polen oder der Tschechoslowakei nicht vergleichbaren Widerstandes in Rumänien herauszuarbeiten. Wichtig ist, dass es solche Resistenzbewegungen auch hier überhaupt gab, obwohl eine Tradition der Teilhabe an der politischen Kultur völlig fehlte. Aus dieser Perspektive dienten im Dezember 1989 kritische Intellektuelle der großen Mehrheit dann doch als Beispiel

The key issue, dealing with the possible process of adopting Western European values and principles of social life, is the following: Why is Serbia alone? Accordingly, How come that ex-Yugoslav member republics have distanced themselves from Serbia? Has Serbia ever been a Piedmont? Why do the Balkanian neighbouring countries not consider Serbia a trusty partner in their “European” aspirations? These are the issues which beg for attention nowadays. Pursuing answers to these questions is actually searching for an answer to the following questions: How to embark on a journey to Europe? If a journey to Europe is what we want, that is.

How do people become either criminals, victims, accomplices or opponents? Until the 1980s people concluded that criminals were as monstrous as the crime they committed. They designed criminal profiles – cruel people who are evil by nature and gain gratification from the suffering of their victims. As the counterpoint, people created the easily seducible citizen, who could be quietly led astray by a demonic clique and whose good faith could be exploited. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, social psychologists and historians discovered that “completely normal people,” who were, in part, loving fathers and husbands, could behave like beasts under real (for example as a camp guard) or experimental conditions. Here, as in other cases, the situation activated impulses that caused each person to take on a certain role. Not only “perpetrators,” but also “helpers” were rewarded for their behaviour in certain situations. In view of such findings, one should abandon certain ideological components of human behaviour and formulate Anthropology that takes into account human motivation and behavioural dispositions.

In current historical research the emotions of political actors have become increasingly relevant, especially the concept of “Rausch” as an emotional mass phenomenon. This essay analyses the semantics of “Rausch” and “emotion” to clear up the relation between these concepts and to finally show, why they should not be mixed up.