The global history of democracy of the interwar period combines the elements of triumph of democracy with the elements of its demise. Between 1914 and 1920 the number of democracies in the world almost tripled. In the short period between early 1919 and mid 1920 the number of democracies worldwide practically exploded. However, this “explosion,” euphorically celebrated by the contemporaries, was followed by “recoil” in the first half of the 1920s and by a deep democracy crisis in the 1930s triggered by the world economic crisis. Neither before nor afterwards has one observed the fall of so many democracies during such a short period of time as in 1933/34, including democracies in such developed industrial states as Germany and Austria.

Bei der Mehrheit der europäischen Fälle stimmen die vorhandenen Datensätze in Bezug auf die Abgrenzung demokratischer und nicht-demokratischer Perioden europäischer Länder überein. Es gibt aber auch einige „Grenzfälle“, konkret Bulgarien, Finnland, Italien, Litauen, Portugal, Rumänien, Spanien und Jugoslawien, bei denen es erhebliche Unstimmigkeiten bezüglich der Antwort auf die Frage gibt, ob und in welchen Perioden sie in der Zwischenkriegszeit demokratisch waren. Wir zeigen, dass manche der Unstimmigkeiten unter Bezugnahme auf historische Untersuchungen gelöst werden können. In anderen Fällen hingegen spiegeln die Differenzen wider, dass es anhand der vorhandenen Informationen kaum möglich ist festzustellen, ob die Qualität der Wahlen oder die Regierungsernennung in diesen Ländern in der Zwischenkriegszeit den Anforderungen einer minimalistischen Demokratiedefinition entsprach.

The First World War led to a profound social and political mobilization as well as a radicalization that fuelled unrest and ultimately nourished fascism and communism. Yet it also gave rise to new authoritarian regimes. Some of them succeeded in suppressing or integrating fascist movements and parties. Authoritarian dictatorships were based on wartime state intervention and seized on entrenched values and expectations that resonated with the popular quest for security and stability. Even charismatic dictatorships depended on these traditional foundations of political rule. Yet the role of traditional values in the interwar period has been overshadowed by the concept of “The Age of Extremes” (Eric Hobsbawm) and virtually neglected by scholars. Without ignoring the important differences, historians and political scientists, in particular, are to relate authoritarian and fascist concepts of political and social order to each other. Moreover, it should be taken into account that the new dictatorships of the interwar period utilized and exploited traditional values and aspirations.

The paper discusses the interplay of the failed consolidation of the Second Polish Republic, growing democracy criticism, and securitization discourses. This interplay resulted in dwindling support for parliamentary democracy. The failed consolidation was facilitated by scenarios of external threat. Furthermore, it can be attributed to the Polish partitions, which caused asymmetrically developed political, economic, social, and cultural predispositions; to the outcomes of World War I and the frontier wars in the East; and to the weak parliamentary system characterized by corruption. The politicians failed to integrate the previously separated parts of Poland and especially the national minorities, which constituted about 30 percent of the population. An atmosphere of threat to the state permeated the public and was further facilitated by securitization discourses of both the right and left. More and more the democratic regime itself was questioned and upheaval sentiments under the slogan of “moral healing” of political life became palpable. All this set the scene for Piłsudski’s coup in May 1926, which resulted in the transition of the parlamentary democracy into an authoritarian regime.

Ideocracies have to look to the people who have the ability to think and act independently within the limits prescribed by the ideology of the system. For this reason, ideocratic regimes cannot aim at completely destroying human autonomy. Indoctrination should thus aspire to generate dispositions to development of convictions that are compliant with the ideology. Ideocracies rely on people who are proactive and capable of thinking for themselves – however, always within the strict limits of the irrevocable essence of the system ideology and without ever questioning the established ideological core. In this inner contradiction of the ideological project are the seeds of its self-destruction.