In Germany, right-wing extremist parties stay to be a marginal phenomenon. The only party of at least regional significance is the NPD. In the newly formed German states it acts somewhat successfully and has achieved seats in two federal parliaments. In East Germany the framework conditions for the extreme right wing are more favourable than in West Germany, and the NPD pursues a strategy which is adjusted to these conditions.

Since the early 1980s, Austria has been one of the European countries with the strongest electoral results of right wing national-populist parties. In 2000, the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) became partner of a coalition government on the national level. After a short weakness at the 2002 national elections, the party seems to be an accepted political actor once again. The 2008 national and the 2009 European elections have proven this trend. After the death of Jörg Haider, a new charismatic leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, has stepped into the limelight. The Austrian political system is under strong pressure of the national-populist radical right. This latter is surfing on a wave of authoritarian, individualistic, xenophobe, and anti-European attitudes of the collective Austrian value system. Young people consider the FPÖ and its youthful chairman Strache the representatives of a counter-culture which might be able to break down the political and social conformity of the weak and unpopular Grand Coalition.

The authors are of the opinion that, after successfully having consolidated democracy, Hungary is really shaken by right-wing extremism. With new actors and an openly national-socialist ideology, the latter may be interpreted as a post-transformation phenomenon in the context of a Hungary - specific situation of mixed influences. “Movement right-wing extremism” meshes party and street. It shows features of a “new social movement”, connected to a historic-symbolic framework openly refering to Fascism. The Jobbik movement makes old wounds and unsolved conflicts obvious, particularly the majority population’s general hatred towards Roma. Thus, right-wing ex­tremism is a phenomenon originating from the midst of society. The population’s dissatisfaction with the elites is due to the populist, polarizing behaviour of the big parties. A militant democracy, distancing itself from extremist poles, is unknown in Hungary.

Despite the generally positive transformation in East Central Europe, there are still participants in politics connecting to the totalitarian inheritance of the past. This essay examines the causes, effects and developments of right-wing extremism in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia from a comparative perspective. Although both countries have much in common as far as historical and current causes for the development of extremism are concerned, they differ particularly in the extent of right- and left-wing extremism. While the Czech Republic’s extreme left-wing KSCM achieved two-digit results in all national elections, since more than one decade right-wing extremist organizations have almost disappeared from the political stage. Meanwhile in Slovakia, by the SNS there exists one of the most successful right-wing extremist parties of Europe, while the orthodox communists are not at all as successful as their Czech comrades. Nevertheless, there are common grounds also beyond the extremist antipodes: Right and left-wing extremists share strongly anti-European and national protective attitudes as well as their own mixture of nationalist and social populist positions.

Zwei populistische Parteien – Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Selbstverteidigung der Republik Polen, SRP) und Liga Polskich Rodzin (Liga der Polnischen Familien, LPR) errangen bei den polnischen Parlamentswahlen von 2001 einen spektakulären Erfolg, der es ihnen nicht nur erlaubte, in den Sejm, sondern auch in eine Koalitionsregierung einzuziehen. Doch erlitten beide Formationen 2007 eine schwere Wahlniederlage und verschwanden nach den Europawahlen von 2009 faktisch von der politischen Bühne. Dieser Beitrag analysiert und erklärt – unter Rückgriff auf das Modell des „Spiegelbildes“ – die Gründe für Erfolg und Scheitern der beiden Parteien. Es wird die Auffassung vertreten, dass das sozial-ökonomische und politische Klima, die Struktur des polnischen Parteiensystems, die Muster innerparteilichen Wettbewerbs wie auch die Verortung der populistischen Parteien auf der Regierung - Opposition - Achse die wichtigsten Erklärungsfaktoren für Erfolg wie Scheitern liefern. Darüber hinaus erwies sich die populistische Identität als in hohem Maße bedeutsam. Ihre Besonderheit wird mit den „zwei Gesichtern“ des polnischen Populismus und der Kombination von vertikaler und horizontaler Exklusion zu erfassen versucht.