Comparative research on authoritarian regimes is at the core of political science. But it must cope with some serious problems : unclear conceptions of the topic itself, insufficient cooperation between political scientists and historians, linkages with political interests that are too close for comfort, an uncontrolled “democracy bias” when defining the research agenda, typologies without historical depth, unclear conceptions of similarity and dissimilarity, and missing “algorithms” of pattern recognition with respect to authoritarian structures and institutional developments. After discussions on these issues from the angles of both epistemology and the sociology of science, handles for more systematic, cumulative, and interdisciplinary comparative research on authoritarian regimes in an historical perspective are derived from evolutionary institutionalism, a recent variant of historical institutionalism. In particular, its approaches towards an analysis of “institutional architecture”, “institutional evolution”, and “institutional morphology” are linked by many examples, with comparative research on authoritarian regimes.

For a comparative study of autocracy, a systematically applied regime typology for the orientation of researchers seems indispensable. The most systematic division of regimes into liberal democracies, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (developed by Juan Linz ) seems to be insufficient for the present. An alternative regime typology is therefore unfolded in the contribution. It is oriented foremost towards legitimacy. It takes into secondary account the holders of power. The presented typology distinguishes between absolutist monarchy, patrimonialism, military dictatorship, ideocratic and neopatrimonial one - party autocracy, constitutional monarchy and neopatrimonial autocratic multi - party regimes, as well as a diverse set of hybrids.

In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten sind durchdachte neue Typologien der Demokratie wie Pilze aus dem Boden geschossen. Zur gleichen Zeit wurden die nichtdemokratischen Systeme als eine Restekategorie behandelt, die wenig Aufmerksamkeit verdient. Wir behaupten, dass diese Vernachlässigung überraschend und unglücklich ist. Die gleichen Gründe für eine Ausdifferenzierung der Typologien der Demokratie gelten auch für die Autokratien. Die Unterscheidungen zwischen verschiedenen Arten der Autokratie sollten dabei durch eine Ausweitung des Merkmalsraums der vorhandenen Typologie der Demokratie geschaffen werden. Wir nutzen den Transformationsindex von Bertelsmann, um verschiedene Typen der Autokratie auf der Grundlage der herkömmlichen Definitionsmerkmale von Demokratie zu unterscheiden. Weiterhin weiten wir das Blickfeld aus auf die Charakterzüge des Herrschers. Das Ziel beider Bestrebungen ist es, die Vorarbeit zu leisten, um Unterscheidungen zwischen verschiedenen Formen der Autokratie als explanans oder als explanandum zu behandeln.

Based on a typology of autocratic regimes which assigns a key role to power legitimacy in distinguishing “basis types”, this article raises the question as to the structural and functional particularities of historical/ political legitimization strategies in the four regime forms of despotism, absolutism, authoritarianism and ideocracy. Four characteristic examples are considered : Turkmenistan, Saudi - Arabia, Belarus and the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin.

According to the critics, there is a “democracy bias“ in current research that results from the fact that the researchers presume that the spread of democracy is more closely interrelated with the assumptions of modernization theory than it actually is. However, the facts show that while the number of democracies has continuously increased, autocracies, single party regimes, monarchies and military regimes have also evolved into limited multiparty systems. One of the main criteria of regime stability is the joint legitimacy granted by the people. The main sources of empirical legitimacy are socio - economic success and an ideology that enhances hegemonic development. A lack of legitimacy is the decisive criterion indicating the collapse of any kind of regime. However, the timing of the collapse also depends on additional features of the structural, institutional and cultural context. Among these, the constellation of actors in relation to the opposing elites is of particular importance.

Der „neue Institutionalismus“ in der vergleichenden Analyse autoritärer Regime nimmt nominell demokratische Institutionen, wie Parteien, Parlamente und Wahlen in nicht - demokratischen Systemen ernst und untersucht sie systematisch. Der Artikel bietet eine analytische Synthese über vier Kernbereiche der Institutionenanalyse in autoritären Regimen: ( i) institutionelle Imperative : die Funktionslogik autoritärer Institutionen; ( ii ) institutionelle Konfigurationen : die Grundoptionen des institutionellen Landschaftsdesigns; ( iii ) institutionelle Domestizierung : das Repertoire an autoritären Kontrollstrategien in unterschiedlichen institutionellen Feldern; und ( iv ) institutionelle Ambivalenz : die Spannung zwischen regimeerhaltenden und regimeerodierenden Effekten, die nominell repräsentative Institutionen in autoritären Systemen zu enfalten neigen.

The old political instrument of military deterrence was further developed in stages between East and West during the Cold War. It became more intricate over the course of several decades. This was not always noticeable to the public. The author’s practical experiences as a war journal officer with large-scale NATO activities in the German navy serve to present and analyze past scenarios of deterrence. It becomes clear as to why the system was not transferable worldwide and that it remains important for this reason that the „established“ nuclear powers also stay exclusive in the future.