Einführung
TD: volume 21, issue 2024, 1, page 3–6
TD: volume 21, issue 2024, 1, page 3–6
TD: volume 21, issue 2024, 1, page 7–10
TD: volume 20, issue 2023, 2, page 135–140
TD: volume 20, issue 2023, 2, page 141–146
TD: volume 20, issue 2023, 2, page 241–254
Es folgt die Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache following the article short description
This article attempts to answer the following questions: Is it primarily the qualities of the actors that explain the establishment and longevity of a civil society organization protecting democracy? Or do such actors owe their success primarily to party-political patronage or state support? What role do socio-cultural conditions play, especially the perception of threats and the way of dealing with them? Since the conditions for success at the micro (actors), meso (competitiveness of actors and opportunity structures) and macro levels (social, political, economic and cultural framework conditions) are manifold and interwoven, no simple, generalisable answer to these questions can be given.
TD: volume 20, issue 2023, 2, page 257–259
TD: volume 18, issue 2021, 1, page 3–5
TD: volume 18, issue 2021, 1, page 6–8
TD: volume 18, issue 2021, 1, page 53–71
Es folgt die Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache following the article short description
Outside Italy, little is known of the anti-Fascism of Francesco Luigi Ferrari, one of the closest allies of Sicilian priest and Christian Democrat Luigi Sturzo. Based on his most important publications before and after his exile (1926), the contribution pursues this crucial question: Did Ferrari, in ways similar to Sturzo’s, combine anti-Fascism with anti-totalitarianism? How did he comparatively classify Italian Fascism as a movement and a regime? To which analytical categories did he reach back for this purpose? Did he change his attitude over time?
TD: volume 17, issue 2020, 1, page 3–6
TD: volume 17, issue 2020, 1, page 7–10
TD: volume 16, issue 2019, 1, page 3–5
TD: volume 16, issue 2019, 1, page 7–8
TD: volume 15, issue 2018, 1, page 3–5
TD: volume 15, issue 2018, 1, page 7–9
TD: volume 14, issue 2017, 2, page 191–194
TD: volume 14, issue 2017, 2, page 195–196
TD: volume 12, issue 2015, 1, page 159–161
TD: volume 11, issue 2014, 1, page 5–8
TD: volume 11, issue 2014, 1, page 9–12
TD: volume 10, issue 2013, 2, page 201–204
TD: volume 10, issue 2013, 2, page 205–208
TD: volume 10, issue 2013, 2, page 325–349
Es folgt die Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache following the article short description
In Germany, politically motivated violence shows a broad range of motivations and ways in which it is organized and committed. It is definitely more than just hate criminality based on xenophobia and racism, as it has been in the focus of the public debate for a number of years. For, quantitatively “left-wing” political violence is not a quantité négligeable and – notwithstanding fundamental differ- ences – has important elements in common with “right - wing” political violence. Accordingly, also the former does not at all lack forms of fighting “objective” enemies as they become obvious as “hate violence” when light is shed on the motivations for the relevant criminal acts. In particular confrontational violence deserves our attention. Apart from the well-known constellation left-wing vs. right-wing this is particularly true for the new line of conflict between those being hostile to muslims on the one hand and Islamists / Salafists on the other, which becomes increasingly more important.
TD: volume 9, issue 2012, 2, page 354–358
TD: volume 7, issue 2010, 1, page 5–8
TD: volume 7, issue 2010, 1, page 9–12
TD: volume 6, issue 2009, 2, page 271–292
Es folgt die Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache following the article short description
Based on a typology of autocratic regimes which assigns a key role to power legitimacy in distinguishing “basis types”, this article raises the question as to the structural and functional particularities of historical/ political legitimization strategies in the four regime forms of despotism, absolutism, authoritarianism and ideocracy. Four characteristic examples are considered : Turkmenistan, Saudi - Arabia, Belarus and the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin.
TD: volume 4, issue 2007, 1, page 17–43
Es folgt die Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache following the article short description
In the past years the right-wing extremist National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) was able to expand their vote potential, especially in eastern Germany. As it has been shown, in the second half of the nineties the party adjusted their political offer according to the demands of the eastern states and their transformation issues, and in some regions it reached a certain level of social anchoring. Particularly, the achieved level of consolidation of democracy and the National Socialist-affinity of the party nevertheless make it seem unlikely that their political “trees will grow towards the sky”.
TD: volume 4, issue 2007, 1, page 182–185
TD: volume 3, issue 2006, 2, page 265–283
Art, Ausmaß und Bedingungen der Begrenzung politischer Grundrechte spiegeln das Freiheitsverständnis demokratischer Verfassungsstaaten. Trotz aller Gemeinsamkeiten in den „fundamentals“ finden in rechtlichen Freiheitsbegrenzungen und der jeweiligen Freiheitsbegrenzungspraxis spezifische historische Erfahrungen ihren Niederschlag, die eine unterschiedliche Wertschätzung von Freiheiten und divergierende Bedrohungsperzeptionen erklären. Der Beitrag vergleicht anhand von Beispielen die Demokratieschutzkonzepte und -praktiken in Deutschland, Frankreich und den USA mit Blick auf die spezifische Art der Begrenzung von Meinungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit. Nach einem historischen Abriss zur Entstehung und rechtlichen Ausformung der Demokratieschutzkonzepte folgt ein Blick auf die jeweilige Praxis seit 1945. Abschließend wird versucht, aus dem Vergleich der Demokratieschutzkonzepte und -praktiken Rückschlüsse auf das ihnen zugrunde liegende Freiheitsverständnis zu ziehen.
Es folgt die Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache following the article short description
TD: volume 2, issue 2005, 1, page 211–213
TD: volume 1, issue 2004, 1, page 77–107
Der Beitrag zeichnet die Entwicklung organisierter politischer Extremismen (Links-, Rechtsextremismus, politisch-religiöser Fundamentalismus) u.a. anhand von Wahlergebnissen und Mitgliederzahlen nach und erörtert deren Gefahrenpotential für den Bestand des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates. Sowohl legal operierende als auch militante/gewaltorientierte Formationen werden behandelt und einem systematischen Vergleich unterzogen. Im Gegensatz zu den Befürchtungen der Demokratiegründer geht von keiner Variante des politischen Extremismus eine ernste Bedrohung für den Bestand des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates aus. Angesichts der in der deutschen Bevölkerung verbreiteten Verdrossenheit gegenüber der „politischen Klasse“ dürfte dieser erfreuliche Befund indes nur dann in überschaubarem Rahmen in die Zukunft hinein verlängert werden können, wenn es gelingt, die Reformfähigkeit des in vielen Bereichen verkrusteten Systems (Stichwort: „Politikblockade“) nachhaltig zu stärken.
Es folgt die Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache following the article short description
The article outlines the development of organized forms of political extremism (left-wing and right-wing extremism, political and religious fundamentalism) with reference to such factors as election results and member counts, and discusses them as a potential threat to the continued existence of the democratic constitutional state. Both legally acknowledged parties and militant formations advocating the use of violence are discussed and subjected to systematic comparison. Contrary to the fears of the founders of democracy in Germany, none of the various forms of political extremism represent a serious threat for the continued existence of the democratic constitutional state. But in view of the widespread resentment of the "political class" in large sectors of the German population, there are dangers in assuming that the gratifyingly high degree of stability achieved by the German constitutional state will automatically and inevitably live on into the future. This will only be the case if it is possible to substantially strengthen the reform potential of a system that in many instances has become hidebound.
TD: volume 1, issue 2004, 2, page 277–280